So I've been thinking about the requirement that Jon placed on Prinz in class today (Ha, indexical!)
It was suggested that it is inappropriate for Prinz to use his account of morality in his defense of his account. Let me lay out how I think the dialectic is supposed to work - maybe I'm missing something.
So, in Chapter 5, Prinz tries to defend his view. Several of the objections he deals with (successfully or otherwise) take something like the following form: Prinz's account of morality (and moral terms) leads to consequence X. Consequence X is absurd/ unacceptable/ counterintuitive. So Prinz's account must be wrong. Modus tollens, and all that.
One strategy Prinz takes is to argue that consequence X isn't in fact unacceptable, or whatever. Jon noted that there are several points where Prinz presupposes the truth of his sentimentalist account in this part of the argument. This move by Prinz is problematically circular, it might appear.
Not so fast! A move like this is (clearly) problematic in some cases. If I argue that the Bible is infallible, and you point out that this leads to the counterintuitive consequence that several fish and several loaves of bread can feed several thousand people, it would certainly NOT be appropriate for me, in engaging this problematic consequence, to invoke my original claim of Biblical infallibility.
But there are cases when I think we do, and should, allow it. Say that I'm Einstein (not metaphorically, but literally). I figure out the theory of general and special relativity, and I'm trying to convince you that it's right. I lay out all the math, and you point out that the theory leads to the counterintuitive consequence that one twin who flies to a distant star and returns will be younger than his other twin who stayed behind. It would not be fair to bar me from invoking the theory of relativity in my defense against this counterintuitive consequence.
I suspect that the case of Prinz is more akin to the example of the theory of relativity than the example of Biblical infallibility. Prinz's positive account (in the previous chapters) is supposed to stand on its own, I think, arrived at by reason rather than by revelation. If we cannot find fault in the positive account, then the question we're faced with is how to reconcile that positive account with the somewhat distasteful consequences. We could run either a modus ponens or a modus tollens, and I think the goal of these later chapters is to make the choice of modus ponens more attractive.
If what I've said so far is right, then our demand for a defense against the counterintuitive consequences of the theory that doesn't bring in the theory itself might be too harsh. We shouldn't ask this much of Prinz.
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I think there are three things you (Einstein) could say in reply to the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. First, you could explain why its counterintuitiveness makes sense even if your theory is correct. Second, you could explain why that counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, for some other reason. Third, you could argue that although that counterintuitiveness does give us some reason to reject your theory, your case for your theory is strong enough that the balance of reasons favors accepting it. None of these involves simply reiterating your theory and pointing out that if your theory is correct, the twin paradox – however counterintuitive – is clearly not problematic. That would beg the question in a way that certainly seems pernicious. The first involves citing your theory, but not to show that it implies the twin paradox but to show that it comports with an explanation of the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The third involves citing the theory, but also requires citing your case for it, and showing that it is strong enough to overcome the prima facie reason we have for rejecting the theory provided by the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The second doesn’t involve citing the theory at all. [For the record, I believe the way to go in this case would be the first, and possibly the second. Almost certainly not the third, as our intuitions about these things are unlikely to be a reliable guide.]
Going back to Prinz, the situation is this. Prinz’s view entails such claims as X:
X. If I didn’t disapprove of murder, murder wouldn’t be wrong.
[if you don’t like “murder” because of its moral connotations just substitute some evaluatively neutral description of a typical case of murder]
The problem for Prinz is that X is counterintuitive. Here are the three analogous options. First, he can show that it makes sense that X is counterintuitive even if his theory is correct. Second, he can explain why its counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, on other grounds. Third, he can argue that although the counterintuitiveness of X does give us reason to reject his theory, his case for his theory is strong enough so that the balance of reasons favors accepting it.
I’m not sure which of these you are recommending (if you are). If the first, then Prinz has to explain why the counterintuitiveness of X makes sense even if his theory is correct (he does try to do this at various points in ch. 3, as we discussed in class). If the second, you seem to have to explain why we shouldn't rely on moral intuition, at least with respect to claims like X. If the third, then Prinz has to make a case for his theory strong enough to overcome the prima facie disadvantage conferred on it by the counterintuitiveness of X. As with Einstein’s theory, in no case is it enough simply to cite the theory and show that, if his theory is correct, X is true.
The reason I think X is so problematic for Prinz is that I don’t think he’s done any of these three things successfully. I don’t think he’s really explained why it seems so clearly false if his view is correct. He hasn’t explained why we shouldn’t trust our intuitions about claims like X. And I don’t think he’s as yet given a case strong enough to overcome the problem generated by X. (Actually, all I have been arguing in recent classes is that claims like X generate a prima facie problem for his view, which *might* be overcome by his positive arguments. So the third reply isn’t actually quite to the point, although of course it would be relevant to the broader point.)
So far as I can see, there are only two other options regarding X: show that his theory doesn’t after all entail it, or show that it isn’t actually counterintuitive. Neither involves simply citing his theory. That seems to beg the question, in a pernicious way.
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