reply to What Rough Beast

[After leaving this in a comment, I realized it would be very difficult to read because the comments section is so narrow. So I decided to put it in a new post. If anyone knows how to expand the comments section, let me know.]

I think there are three things you (Einstein) could say in reply to the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. First, you could explain why its counterintuitiveness makes sense even if your theory is correct. Second, you could explain why that counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, for some other reason. Third, you could argue that although that counterintuitiveness does give us some reason to reject your theory, your case for your theory is strong enough that the balance of reasons favors accepting it. None of these involves simply reiterating your theory and pointing out that if your theory is correct, the twin paradox – however counterintuitive – is clearly not problematic. That would beg the question in a way that certainly seems pernicious. The first involves citing your theory, but not to show that it implies the twin paradox but to show that it comports with an explanation of the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The third involves citing the theory, but also requires citing your case for it, and showing that it is strong enough to overcome the prima facie reason we have for rejecting the theory provided by the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The second doesn’t involve citing the theory at all. [For the record, I believe the way to go in this case would be the first, and possibly the second. Almost certainly not the third, as our intuitions about these things are unlikely to be a reliable guide.]

Going back to Prinz, the situation is this. Prinz’s view entails such claims as X:

X. If I didn’t disapprove of murder, murder wouldn’t be wrong.

[if you don’t like “murder” because of its moral connotations just substitute some evaluatively neutral description of a typical case of murder]

The problem for Prinz is that X is counterintuitive. Here are the three analogous options. First, he can show that it makes sense that X is counterintuitive even if his theory is correct. Second, he can explain why its counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, on other grounds. Third, he can argue that although the counterintuitiveness of X does give us reason to reject his theory, his case for his theory is strong enough so that the balance of reasons favors accepting it.

I’m not sure which of these you are recommending (if you are). If the first, then Prinz has to explain why the counterintuitiveness of X makes sense even if his theory is correct (he does try to do this at various points in ch. 3, as we discussed in class). If the second, you seem to have to explain why we shouldn't rely on moral intuition, at least with respect to claims like X. If the third, then Prinz has to make a case for his theory strong enough to overcome the prima facie disadvantage conferred on it by the counterintuitiveness of X. As with Einstein’s theory, in no case is it enough simply to cite the theory and show that, if his theory is correct, X is true.

The reason I think X is so problematic for Prinz is that I don’t think he’s done any of these three things successfully. I don’t think he’s really explained why it seems so clearly false if his view is correct. He hasn’t explained why we shouldn’t trust our intuitions about claims like X. And I don’t think he’s as yet given a case strong enough to overcome the problem generated by X. (Actually, all I have been arguing in recent classes is that claims like X generate a prima facie problem for his view, which *might* be overcome by his positive arguments. So the third reply isn’t actually quite to the point, although of course it would be relevant to the broader point.)

So far as I can see, there are only two other options regarding X: show that his theory doesn’t after all entail it, or show that it isn’t actually counterintuitive. Neither involves simply citing his theory. That seems to beg the question, in a pernicious way.