Today we talked a bit about the role that vivid examples play in making general properties into elicitors of attitudes.
Introspecting the moral issues I'm most passionate about, I find that in some cases, indeed, there are vivid examples which prompt those beliefs (or at least maintain them in a very strong fashion). However, I think it should also be emphasized that vivid examples are not the whole story on what influences us to have strong moral attitudes towards this or that property. Consider an example:
When I was very young I was at a park with my parents. There were not a lot of people around. I was throwing a few rocks as high up in the air and as far as I could manage. At one point I turned around and threw one and, to my horror, there was another child standing in the 'field of fire.' As the rock fell to the ground, it turns out that it harmlessly landed 10-20 yards away. Neither my parents nor the child (nor anyone else, as far as I could tell) noticed. However, the terror and guilt I felt was influential on me. I don't know exactly how I conceptualized it then, but basically I concluded that your actions can have serious consequences. I remember thinking that I could have killed the child with the rock.
In the example above, there are certainly powerful emotions at work, and the event is vivid in my mind even today recalling it. However, it does not represent a vivid example of a certain type of action having ill consequences for fitness, nor is it a vivid example of brutality, shirking, etc. No terrible consequence was actualized. The event was influential because I could imagine the bad consequences which I could have easily caused (given my carelessness). The role vivid examples play need not be a linking up between event types (with certain general properties) and innate types of actions we might be predisposed to be sensitive to. Nor need it be a linking up of an event type and ill consequences more generally. The connection between carelessness and bad consequences wasn't established by a vivid example alone, but by an emotionally charge event and my imagination of possible bad consequences.
Other values I hold passionately are not even prompted by particular events (as best as I can tell), but are the result of ideological positions I've adopted. While some free-market conservatives may be rich and want to keep their money, and some socialists may be poor and want entitlements, material conditions seem not to be enough to explain moral and political positions generally.
Both the above examples illustrate the limitations of the influence of vivid examples on the properties that come to elicit moral attitudes. Vivid events (even with appropriate innate predispositions) are not necessary for generating strong moral beliefs about events that instantiate certain properties. They may sometimes be influential, but are not necessary.
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
Monday, November 3, 2008
Problem for the Argument Against Objectivism
The argument that Tresan considers against objectivism begins:
(1) If objectivism is true, there is an instantiated property F such that necessarily all wrong-judgments attribute F.
This premise is said to be true, allegedly, by the definition of ‘objectivism.’ It is this point that I wish to contend with. I do not believe that (1) follows from a proper definition of ‘objectivism,’ and if I am correct, then the argument that Tresan presents against objectivism never gets off the ground.
For starters, what sort of thing is the objectivitist position about in the first place? Certainly not judgments! Of course, it will have implications for judgments—but it itself is not about judgments. It is about properties. As I understand it, objectivism is the view that there is some instantiated property F, and it is in virtue of having or lacking F that actions are morally right or wrong. From this it follows that if I judge some action, A, to be wrong, the proposition that my judgment expresses (“A is wrong”) can only be true if A has the property F (for the simplicity of discussion, let us stipulate that F=the action involves treating a person merely as a means). It does not follow, however, that all judgments of wrongness will be about property F. Someone else could judge that A is wrong, and still be correct, even though they do not even consider whether A has F—they make the judgment because they believe A has some other property, G (for instance, G=fails to maximize utility).
This strikes me as similar to the distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule. When I follow a rule (say: “You are not allowed to wear jeans to the office place”), I act with that rule in mind. I perhaps consider coming into work wearing jeans, and then recall that there is a rule against it—so decide not to. When I merely act in accordance with the rule, I do not think of the rule when I act. I need not even know the rule exists! Suppose I am the type of person who hates jeans, and wouldn’t wear them even if it were allowed. Suppose further, I do not ever bother reading the office’s rules regarding dress code, because I always dress in business-appropriate attire. When I come to work in slacks, I could be said to be acting in accordance with the rule, but not following it. If all you care about is whether I am wearing jeans or not, you need not concern yourself with why I am not wearing jeans (whether I followed the rule, or merely acted in accordance with it). Similarly, if all you care about is if a moral judgment expresses a true proposition, you do not need to inquire into why the judger makes the judgment (the proposition, “A is wrong,” is not any less true if a Utilitarian makes it in virtue of his belief that A has G, than when the Kantian makes the same judgment, in virtue of his belief that A has F).
If my understanding of objectivity is correct, then (1) is false. There can be wrong-judgments that do not attribute F. There can even be true wrong-judgments that do not attribute F! I contend that (1) should be rephrased to say that: “necessarily all wrong-judgments are true in virtue of whether or not the action has property F.” However, if reworded this way, (1) does not do the work it is needed to do in the argument against objectivity.
Well, I had a few things I have been trying to work out in response to the sort of reply I believe Tresan will give to my above account… but perhaps I should just await that reply.
(1) If objectivism is true, there is an instantiated property F such that necessarily all wrong-judgments attribute F.
This premise is said to be true, allegedly, by the definition of ‘objectivism.’ It is this point that I wish to contend with. I do not believe that (1) follows from a proper definition of ‘objectivism,’ and if I am correct, then the argument that Tresan presents against objectivism never gets off the ground.
For starters, what sort of thing is the objectivitist position about in the first place? Certainly not judgments! Of course, it will have implications for judgments—but it itself is not about judgments. It is about properties. As I understand it, objectivism is the view that there is some instantiated property F, and it is in virtue of having or lacking F that actions are morally right or wrong. From this it follows that if I judge some action, A, to be wrong, the proposition that my judgment expresses (“A is wrong”) can only be true if A has the property F (for the simplicity of discussion, let us stipulate that F=the action involves treating a person merely as a means). It does not follow, however, that all judgments of wrongness will be about property F. Someone else could judge that A is wrong, and still be correct, even though they do not even consider whether A has F—they make the judgment because they believe A has some other property, G (for instance, G=fails to maximize utility).
This strikes me as similar to the distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule. When I follow a rule (say: “You are not allowed to wear jeans to the office place”), I act with that rule in mind. I perhaps consider coming into work wearing jeans, and then recall that there is a rule against it—so decide not to. When I merely act in accordance with the rule, I do not think of the rule when I act. I need not even know the rule exists! Suppose I am the type of person who hates jeans, and wouldn’t wear them even if it were allowed. Suppose further, I do not ever bother reading the office’s rules regarding dress code, because I always dress in business-appropriate attire. When I come to work in slacks, I could be said to be acting in accordance with the rule, but not following it. If all you care about is whether I am wearing jeans or not, you need not concern yourself with why I am not wearing jeans (whether I followed the rule, or merely acted in accordance with it). Similarly, if all you care about is if a moral judgment expresses a true proposition, you do not need to inquire into why the judger makes the judgment (the proposition, “A is wrong,” is not any less true if a Utilitarian makes it in virtue of his belief that A has G, than when the Kantian makes the same judgment, in virtue of his belief that A has F).
If my understanding of objectivity is correct, then (1) is false. There can be wrong-judgments that do not attribute F. There can even be true wrong-judgments that do not attribute F! I contend that (1) should be rephrased to say that: “necessarily all wrong-judgments are true in virtue of whether or not the action has property F.” However, if reworded this way, (1) does not do the work it is needed to do in the argument against objectivity.
Well, I had a few things I have been trying to work out in response to the sort of reply I believe Tresan will give to my above account… but perhaps I should just await that reply.
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