Prinz and normative theory

I have been thinking for a while about the normative implications of Prinz’s theory. Prinz makes a number of remarks about this, though I wanted to add my own thoughts. We have previously discussed the claim that relativism entails a form of extreme tolerance – Prinz does not think this follows and neither do I, but that will not be my focus here. Instead, I will focus on the implications of relativism and the psychological claims Prinz presents for classical ethical theories such as utilitarianism, and whether a different theory could be constructed based on such considerations.


Of course, if relativism is correct, then there is no absolute moral truth. If, for instance, there is some sense in which utilitarianism is correct, it is a sense in which Kantianism, Aristotelian ethics, or the current teachings of the Catholic Church are correct – namely, it is correct for those who accept in the relevant way. There is a sense in which all theories are correct. However, as Prinz notes in next week’s reading (chapter 8), our moral beliefs can be analyzed, and not just in some empty sense like “your theory is wrong for me.” For instance, a theory may presuppose factual errors, or a person may hold inconsistent moral beliefs (the latter may not be true of a single principle theory like utilitarianism, but only a small portion of the population are genuine single principle theorists). He is also right to point out that consistency is not the only or even necessarily the most important virtue a theory can have – one can be consistent and evil.


Prinz’s psychological theory may also provide a lens through which moral theories can be analyzed, and which may show some to be deficient. For instance, Prinz argues that emotions play a critical role in learning moral theory, and that one who does not have the right emotions can never adequately understand morality. He cites psychopaths as an example. His claim is that because psychopaths are emotionally deficient, and because emotions play a critical role in moral education, they never really learn right from wrong, but instead come up with seemingly bizarre misunderstandings (for instance, conflating moral and conventional rules). If he is right, this would pose a major problem for views that seem to render emotions unnecessary.


One example is utilitarianism. Emotions don’t seem to play much of a role in utilitarian calculations – in fact, utilitarians are often criticized for neglecting emotion (for instance, one is supposed to help one’s close relatives only to the extent that doing so promotes the greatest overall happiness). Interestingly, as Prinz notes on p. 80, a study found people several times more likely to judge that it is acceptable to kill one person to save several (a classical utilitarian position) after watching a clip from Saturday Night Live. This result makes it appear as though utilitarians may be showing a sort of emotional desensitization. If my analysis is correct, then utilitarianism seems to be in trouble.


Another interesting case is Kant’s moral theory. In some respects, Kantianism may seem to fare better. For instance, Kant argues that a person’s moral worth depends on having the right motivation, not just on following the rules. Kant takes this conclusion quite far, arguing that moral worth is proven only in cases in which a person is motivated only by a sense of duty. This appears to parallel Prinz’s remarks about morality in apes – though they may behave at times in ways that appear to be moral, they do not appear to have the right kind of motivation. However, Kant’s sense of duty is emotionally cold, especially the first formulation on universalizing maxims. Kant explicitly argues that actions based on motives such as love are not truly moral actions. In contrast, such emotions are at the core of Prinz’s theory.


Do any theories fare better? One clue is to be found in how morality is learned. Specifically, it requires emotional sensitivity. Morality, for Prinz, is not the kind of thing that can be learned from a book. One cannot master morality by reading Kant, Mill, or anyone else. Those of you who took David’s ethical theory course last semester may be reminded of Julia Annas’ article on virtue theory, which made a very similar claim. Prinz has some concerns about virtue theories, especially those based on conceptions of virtue as part of overall well-being. However, I think his psychological argument pushes us strongly in a virtue ethical direction, and there are a wide range of virtue theories, so, for instance, we need not accept anything like Aristotle’s teleology.

posted by JT on behalf of AM