We didn't get to talk about the final section of chapter five concerning the insidiousness of relativism. On the handout I made, I only had two questions:
1. Is relativism insidious?
2. Does relativism promote tolerance?
I can throw out some ideas of my own that loosely tie into these questions.
Prinz remarks that some objections to relativism are due to a concern that if relativism is true, all moral debates will be spurious. If we understand that no one has a wrong morality, then relativism provides the framework for tolerance. I'm right and so are you. There's no need for me to force my morality upon you. In fact, Prinz thinks that relativism is more compatible with tolerance than absolutism, because all absolutism has is epistemic uncertainty.
I think Prinz is mistaken in this claim. The absolutist can be tolerant for other reasons. In fact, if the absolutist is completely certain (somehow) that his morality is correct, he can still be tolerant of another's morality. I am still tolerant of those who reject evolution as true even though I am quite certain myself that it is true.
Prinz admits that relativism does not entail tolerance, but he is fairly certain relativism promotes tolerance. I don't think relativism alone can promote tolerance, however. Prinz acknowledges that on 213. We have to have another value that inflicting morality on others is bad if we don't have any more claim to the truth than others do. But it still seems to me that there are persistent moral disagreements and tensions that relativism will have a difficult time addressing. Prinz tries to show that we can and maybe should intervene in cases of female circumcision, because if it goes against our value system, we can be justified in acting. But this is not tolerance. Why would the relativist be opposed to female circumcision? Sure, it's wrong for us, but it's right for them, and they want to do it, so what business do we have to intervene? I don't see how we can step in and be tolerant at the same time. It may be in our value system, or right for us, to intervene in others' affairs when we don't have a truer morality, but that conflicts with tolerance, which requires us to think it bad to intervene in those cases. Unless I'm missing something, either we accept that no one's morality is truer or better than anyone else's morality and keep to ourselves (being tolerant), or we impose upon others with the idea that our morality is better even though we know (or think) that all morality is on equal footing when it comes to truth value (which isn't tolerance). Neither option looks too attractive to me.
So it looks like the tolerance in itself might be part of the insidiousness of relativism. Are we forced to tolerate genocides because we don't have access to a better truth system than other bloody regimes? That certainly doesn't sound right. Even if relativism does promote tolerance, I'm not sure some things should be tolerated. But I have this conviction because I think that some moral values are better than others. The relativist can't make this move. Doesn't it seem an important option to have though?
Of course, none of this disproves relativism. If it is true, we would have to accept that it is true, along with its consequences. But I don't think relativism is as sunny as Prinz would have us think.
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
reply to What Rough Beast
[After leaving this in a comment, I realized it would be very difficult to read because the comments section is so narrow. So I decided to put it in a new post. If anyone knows how to expand the comments section, let me know.]
I think there are three things you (Einstein) could say in reply to the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. First, you could explain why its counterintuitiveness makes sense even if your theory is correct. Second, you could explain why that counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, for some other reason. Third, you could argue that although that counterintuitiveness does give us some reason to reject your theory, your case for your theory is strong enough that the balance of reasons favors accepting it. None of these involves simply reiterating your theory and pointing out that if your theory is correct, the twin paradox – however counterintuitive – is clearly not problematic. That would beg the question in a way that certainly seems pernicious. The first involves citing your theory, but not to show that it implies the twin paradox but to show that it comports with an explanation of the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The third involves citing the theory, but also requires citing your case for it, and showing that it is strong enough to overcome the prima facie reason we have for rejecting the theory provided by the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The second doesn’t involve citing the theory at all. [For the record, I believe the way to go in this case would be the first, and possibly the second. Almost certainly not the third, as our intuitions about these things are unlikely to be a reliable guide.]
Going back to Prinz, the situation is this. Prinz’s view entails such claims as X:
X. If I didn’t disapprove of murder, murder wouldn’t be wrong.
[if you don’t like “murder” because of its moral connotations just substitute some evaluatively neutral description of a typical case of murder]
The problem for Prinz is that X is counterintuitive. Here are the three analogous options. First, he can show that it makes sense that X is counterintuitive even if his theory is correct. Second, he can explain why its counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, on other grounds. Third, he can argue that although the counterintuitiveness of X does give us reason to reject his theory, his case for his theory is strong enough so that the balance of reasons favors accepting it.
I’m not sure which of these you are recommending (if you are). If the first, then Prinz has to explain why the counterintuitiveness of X makes sense even if his theory is correct (he does try to do this at various points in ch. 3, as we discussed in class). If the second, you seem to have to explain why we shouldn't rely on moral intuition, at least with respect to claims like X. If the third, then Prinz has to make a case for his theory strong enough to overcome the prima facie disadvantage conferred on it by the counterintuitiveness of X. As with Einstein’s theory, in no case is it enough simply to cite the theory and show that, if his theory is correct, X is true.
The reason I think X is so problematic for Prinz is that I don’t think he’s done any of these three things successfully. I don’t think he’s really explained why it seems so clearly false if his view is correct. He hasn’t explained why we shouldn’t trust our intuitions about claims like X. And I don’t think he’s as yet given a case strong enough to overcome the problem generated by X. (Actually, all I have been arguing in recent classes is that claims like X generate a prima facie problem for his view, which *might* be overcome by his positive arguments. So the third reply isn’t actually quite to the point, although of course it would be relevant to the broader point.)
So far as I can see, there are only two other options regarding X: show that his theory doesn’t after all entail it, or show that it isn’t actually counterintuitive. Neither involves simply citing his theory. That seems to beg the question, in a pernicious way.
I think there are three things you (Einstein) could say in reply to the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. First, you could explain why its counterintuitiveness makes sense even if your theory is correct. Second, you could explain why that counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, for some other reason. Third, you could argue that although that counterintuitiveness does give us some reason to reject your theory, your case for your theory is strong enough that the balance of reasons favors accepting it. None of these involves simply reiterating your theory and pointing out that if your theory is correct, the twin paradox – however counterintuitive – is clearly not problematic. That would beg the question in a way that certainly seems pernicious. The first involves citing your theory, but not to show that it implies the twin paradox but to show that it comports with an explanation of the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The third involves citing the theory, but also requires citing your case for it, and showing that it is strong enough to overcome the prima facie reason we have for rejecting the theory provided by the counterintuitiveness of the twin paradox. The second doesn’t involve citing the theory at all. [For the record, I believe the way to go in this case would be the first, and possibly the second. Almost certainly not the third, as our intuitions about these things are unlikely to be a reliable guide.]
Going back to Prinz, the situation is this. Prinz’s view entails such claims as X:
X. If I didn’t disapprove of murder, murder wouldn’t be wrong.
[if you don’t like “murder” because of its moral connotations just substitute some evaluatively neutral description of a typical case of murder]
The problem for Prinz is that X is counterintuitive. Here are the three analogous options. First, he can show that it makes sense that X is counterintuitive even if his theory is correct. Second, he can explain why its counterintuitiveness has no probative weight, on other grounds. Third, he can argue that although the counterintuitiveness of X does give us reason to reject his theory, his case for his theory is strong enough so that the balance of reasons favors accepting it.
I’m not sure which of these you are recommending (if you are). If the first, then Prinz has to explain why the counterintuitiveness of X makes sense even if his theory is correct (he does try to do this at various points in ch. 3, as we discussed in class). If the second, you seem to have to explain why we shouldn't rely on moral intuition, at least with respect to claims like X. If the third, then Prinz has to make a case for his theory strong enough to overcome the prima facie disadvantage conferred on it by the counterintuitiveness of X. As with Einstein’s theory, in no case is it enough simply to cite the theory and show that, if his theory is correct, X is true.
The reason I think X is so problematic for Prinz is that I don’t think he’s done any of these three things successfully. I don’t think he’s really explained why it seems so clearly false if his view is correct. He hasn’t explained why we shouldn’t trust our intuitions about claims like X. And I don’t think he’s as yet given a case strong enough to overcome the problem generated by X. (Actually, all I have been arguing in recent classes is that claims like X generate a prima facie problem for his view, which *might* be overcome by his positive arguments. So the third reply isn’t actually quite to the point, although of course it would be relevant to the broader point.)
So far as I can see, there are only two other options regarding X: show that his theory doesn’t after all entail it, or show that it isn’t actually counterintuitive. Neither involves simply citing his theory. That seems to beg the question, in a pernicious way.
Ask not what Prinz should ask of you, but what you should ask of Prinz
So I've been thinking about the requirement that Jon placed on Prinz in class today (Ha, indexical!)
It was suggested that it is inappropriate for Prinz to use his account of morality in his defense of his account. Let me lay out how I think the dialectic is supposed to work - maybe I'm missing something.
So, in Chapter 5, Prinz tries to defend his view. Several of the objections he deals with (successfully or otherwise) take something like the following form: Prinz's account of morality (and moral terms) leads to consequence X. Consequence X is absurd/ unacceptable/ counterintuitive. So Prinz's account must be wrong. Modus tollens, and all that.
One strategy Prinz takes is to argue that consequence X isn't in fact unacceptable, or whatever. Jon noted that there are several points where Prinz presupposes the truth of his sentimentalist account in this part of the argument. This move by Prinz is problematically circular, it might appear.
Not so fast! A move like this is (clearly) problematic in some cases. If I argue that the Bible is infallible, and you point out that this leads to the counterintuitive consequence that several fish and several loaves of bread can feed several thousand people, it would certainly NOT be appropriate for me, in engaging this problematic consequence, to invoke my original claim of Biblical infallibility.
But there are cases when I think we do, and should, allow it. Say that I'm Einstein (not metaphorically, but literally). I figure out the theory of general and special relativity, and I'm trying to convince you that it's right. I lay out all the math, and you point out that the theory leads to the counterintuitive consequence that one twin who flies to a distant star and returns will be younger than his other twin who stayed behind. It would not be fair to bar me from invoking the theory of relativity in my defense against this counterintuitive consequence.
I suspect that the case of Prinz is more akin to the example of the theory of relativity than the example of Biblical infallibility. Prinz's positive account (in the previous chapters) is supposed to stand on its own, I think, arrived at by reason rather than by revelation. If we cannot find fault in the positive account, then the question we're faced with is how to reconcile that positive account with the somewhat distasteful consequences. We could run either a modus ponens or a modus tollens, and I think the goal of these later chapters is to make the choice of modus ponens more attractive.
If what I've said so far is right, then our demand for a defense against the counterintuitive consequences of the theory that doesn't bring in the theory itself might be too harsh. We shouldn't ask this much of Prinz.
It was suggested that it is inappropriate for Prinz to use his account of morality in his defense of his account. Let me lay out how I think the dialectic is supposed to work - maybe I'm missing something.
So, in Chapter 5, Prinz tries to defend his view. Several of the objections he deals with (successfully or otherwise) take something like the following form: Prinz's account of morality (and moral terms) leads to consequence X. Consequence X is absurd/ unacceptable/ counterintuitive. So Prinz's account must be wrong. Modus tollens, and all that.
One strategy Prinz takes is to argue that consequence X isn't in fact unacceptable, or whatever. Jon noted that there are several points where Prinz presupposes the truth of his sentimentalist account in this part of the argument. This move by Prinz is problematically circular, it might appear.
Not so fast! A move like this is (clearly) problematic in some cases. If I argue that the Bible is infallible, and you point out that this leads to the counterintuitive consequence that several fish and several loaves of bread can feed several thousand people, it would certainly NOT be appropriate for me, in engaging this problematic consequence, to invoke my original claim of Biblical infallibility.
But there are cases when I think we do, and should, allow it. Say that I'm Einstein (not metaphorically, but literally). I figure out the theory of general and special relativity, and I'm trying to convince you that it's right. I lay out all the math, and you point out that the theory leads to the counterintuitive consequence that one twin who flies to a distant star and returns will be younger than his other twin who stayed behind. It would not be fair to bar me from invoking the theory of relativity in my defense against this counterintuitive consequence.
I suspect that the case of Prinz is more akin to the example of the theory of relativity than the example of Biblical infallibility. Prinz's positive account (in the previous chapters) is supposed to stand on its own, I think, arrived at by reason rather than by revelation. If we cannot find fault in the positive account, then the question we're faced with is how to reconcile that positive account with the somewhat distasteful consequences. We could run either a modus ponens or a modus tollens, and I think the goal of these later chapters is to make the choice of modus ponens more attractive.
If what I've said so far is right, then our demand for a defense against the counterintuitive consequences of the theory that doesn't bring in the theory itself might be too harsh. We shouldn't ask this much of Prinz.
Thursday, October 16, 2008
some questions worth thinking (and blogging!) about...
[[of course, feel free to ignore these and raise other issues instead]]
1. How powerful are the objections to relativistic views like Prinz's that we've been considering in class (and that he considers in ch. 4)? I mean the objections from disagreement and so on.
2. What exactly is Prinz's view? Have I understood it correctly? I'm not at all sure that I have. My interpretation, recall, is that he seems to be defending two main claims:
first:
x is wrong-to-S iff there is a property F such that
(i) S has a sentiment of disapprobation to F actions
(ii) Fx
[[in my terminology, (i) = F is an elicitor, for S, of the relevant kinds of con-attitudes (those in the "disapprobation spectrum".]]
second:
the standard, default meaning of "x is wrong" is "x is wrong-to-me"
(as with, perhaps, "x is scary/enjoyable/upsetting/disturbing" etc.)
3. Even aside from whether there is another way of construing his view, is there another view which is at least similar to that one -- something in its vicinity -- which is defensible or interesting?
4. Does Prinz have any arguments against objectivism you regard as powerful or at least potentially so? If so, which?
5. What is the most interesting thing you have to say about morality?
1. How powerful are the objections to relativistic views like Prinz's that we've been considering in class (and that he considers in ch. 4)? I mean the objections from disagreement and so on.
2. What exactly is Prinz's view? Have I understood it correctly? I'm not at all sure that I have. My interpretation, recall, is that he seems to be defending two main claims:
first:
x is wrong-to-S iff there is a property F such that
(i) S has a sentiment of disapprobation to F actions
(ii) Fx
[[in my terminology, (i) = F is an elicitor, for S, of the relevant kinds of con-attitudes (those in the "disapprobation spectrum".]]
second:
the standard, default meaning of "x is wrong" is "x is wrong-to-me"
(as with, perhaps, "x is scary/enjoyable/upsetting/disturbing" etc.)
3. Even aside from whether there is another way of construing his view, is there another view which is at least similar to that one -- something in its vicinity -- which is defensible or interesting?
4. Does Prinz have any arguments against objectivism you regard as powerful or at least potentially so? If so, which?
5. What is the most interesting thing you have to say about morality?
welcome!
welcome to deep thoughts about morality. not all thoughts must be deep, but let us hope that some of them will be.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)