some questions worth thinking (and blogging!) about...

[[of course, feel free to ignore these and raise other issues instead]]

1. How powerful are the objections to relativistic views like Prinz's that we've been considering in class (and that he considers in ch. 4)? I mean the objections from disagreement and so on.

2. What exactly is Prinz's view? Have I understood it correctly? I'm not at all sure that I have. My interpretation, recall, is that he seems to be defending two main claims:
first:
x is wrong-to-S iff there is a property F such that
(i) S has a sentiment of disapprobation to F actions
(ii) Fx

[[in my terminology, (i) = F is an elicitor, for S, of the relevant kinds of con-attitudes (those in the "disapprobation spectrum".]]

second:
the standard, default meaning of "x is wrong" is "x is wrong-to-me"
(as with, perhaps, "x is scary/enjoyable/upsetting/disturbing" etc.)

3. Even aside from whether there is another way of construing his view, is there another view which is at least similar to that one -- something in its vicinity -- which is defensible or interesting?

4. Does Prinz have any arguments against objectivism you regard as powerful or at least potentially so? If so, which?

5. What is the most interesting thing you have to say about morality?