The argument that Tresan considers against objectivism begins:
(1) If objectivism is true, there is an instantiated property F such that necessarily all wrong-judgments attribute F.
This premise is said to be true, allegedly, by the definition of ‘objectivism.’ It is this point that I wish to contend with. I do not believe that (1) follows from a proper definition of ‘objectivism,’ and if I am correct, then the argument that Tresan presents against objectivism never gets off the ground.
For starters, what sort of thing is the objectivitist position about in the first place? Certainly not judgments! Of course, it will have implications for judgments—but it itself is not about judgments. It is about properties. As I understand it, objectivism is the view that there is some instantiated property F, and it is in virtue of having or lacking F that actions are morally right or wrong. From this it follows that if I judge some action, A, to be wrong, the proposition that my judgment expresses (“A is wrong”) can only be true if A has the property F (for the simplicity of discussion, let us stipulate that F=the action involves treating a person merely as a means). It does not follow, however, that all judgments of wrongness will be about property F. Someone else could judge that A is wrong, and still be correct, even though they do not even consider whether A has F—they make the judgment because they believe A has some other property, G (for instance, G=fails to maximize utility).
This strikes me as similar to the distinction between following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule. When I follow a rule (say: “You are not allowed to wear jeans to the office place”), I act with that rule in mind. I perhaps consider coming into work wearing jeans, and then recall that there is a rule against it—so decide not to. When I merely act in accordance with the rule, I do not think of the rule when I act. I need not even know the rule exists! Suppose I am the type of person who hates jeans, and wouldn’t wear them even if it were allowed. Suppose further, I do not ever bother reading the office’s rules regarding dress code, because I always dress in business-appropriate attire. When I come to work in slacks, I could be said to be acting in accordance with the rule, but not following it. If all you care about is whether I am wearing jeans or not, you need not concern yourself with why I am not wearing jeans (whether I followed the rule, or merely acted in accordance with it). Similarly, if all you care about is if a moral judgment expresses a true proposition, you do not need to inquire into why the judger makes the judgment (the proposition, “A is wrong,” is not any less true if a Utilitarian makes it in virtue of his belief that A has G, than when the Kantian makes the same judgment, in virtue of his belief that A has F).
If my understanding of objectivity is correct, then (1) is false. There can be wrong-judgments that do not attribute F. There can even be true wrong-judgments that do not attribute F! I contend that (1) should be rephrased to say that: “necessarily all wrong-judgments are true in virtue of whether or not the action has property F.” However, if reworded this way, (1) does not do the work it is needed to do in the argument against objectivity.
Well, I had a few things I have been trying to work out in response to the sort of reply I believe Tresan will give to my above account… but perhaps I should just await that reply.
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There are some nice distinctions here, and given the definitions involved I would agree that "(1) should be rephrased to say that: “necessarily all wrong-judgments are true in virtue of whether or not the action has property F.”" In fact, that's what I meant by "wrong-judgments attribute F". For a judgment to attribute a property -- in the sense I meant -- is for that judgment to be true iff what the judgment is about has that property. I should have clarified this in class. I certainly don't intend that "attribution" involves the judger *thinking in terms of* the attributed property. As Brian notes, utilitarians who judge that x is wrong may be attributing to x the property of failing to treat persons as ends, even though they are not thinking in those terms at all. ("Thinking in terms of" is what I was referring to with the phrase "epistemic occurence-conditions".) So, in short, here is a translation of my terminology into Brian's:
"wrong-judgments attribute F" = "wrong-judgments are true in virtue of whether what is judged to be wrong has F"
"the epistemic occurrence-conditions of wrong-judgments include F" = "wrong-judgments are about/attribute F"
So now my questions is:
Why does Brian think that (1) -- interpreted in the way that we both think it needs to be interpreted to be true -- "does not do the work it is needed to do in the argument against objectivity"? Presumably it's because when "attributes F" is replaced with (or taken to mean, as I intended) "is true in virtue of F", either premise 8* or 9* is implausible. But which one?
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